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Dividend Irrelevance and Accounting
Models of Value
WILLIAM REES AND ALJOSA VALENTINCIC∗
Abstract: In accounting models of value, dividends typically appear to have a strong positive
relationship with value despite theoretical reasons to expect dividend displacement. We show
that this result is driven by the relationship between dividends and both core earnings and
other information derived from the valuation error in the prior year. Where core earnings can
be effectively modelled in a specification including other information, dividend displacement
is no longer rejected. Under these circumstances dividends exhibit weak incremental predictive
power for earnings and earnings expectations and hence have little impact on value. We show
that valuation models are sensitive to model specification and should be used with caution when
testing the value impact of firm characteristics or accounting numbers.
Keywords: dividend displacement, core earnings, other information, valuation models, value
relevance tests
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we revisit a problem that has been puzzling researchers for some time:
why do dividends appear to have a strong positive impact on value in accounting-based
models (e.g. Rees, 1997; Fama and French, 1998; Giner and Rees, 1999; Akbar and
Stark, 2003; and Hand and Landsman, 2005) when Miller and Modigliani’s (1961)
dividend irrelevance theory would have us expect dividend displacement? There are
two possible, not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations. Firstly, paying dividends
may be value relevant, at least in certain circumstances. This relevance could be driven
by a causal impact of dividends on value or an incremental predictive association of
dividends with value. Secondly, the results in the papers referred to above may be
misleading in that they overstate the impact on value of paying dividends.
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According to the original Miller and Modigliani (1961, hereafter M&M) hypothesis,
dividend policy should not impact on value unless it implies changes in a firm’s
value-creating investments or operational decisions.1 Therefore if a firm pays out
one unit of currency to its shareholders, it loses value by one unit, unless there is a
further impact of that transaction on operational or investment decisions. Miller and
Modigliani’s (1961) definition of their basic assumptions of perfect markets, rational
behaviour and perfect certainty clarify some of the circumstances in which we might
find a positive valuation effect of dividends. Briefly summarised, they exclude from
their model dominant shareholders, information asymmetry, transaction costs, tax
effects, incentives other than wealth maximisation, and uncertainty about the “future
investment programme and future profits of every corporation” (1961, p. 412). Thus, we might
look for a value impact of dividend payment where these restrictions do not apply
i.e., where we have inefficient capital markets, governance issues, agency problems,
information asymmetry and signalling, differential tax treatment or uncertainty. This
wide list of exemptions suggests that dividend relevance could be quite common and
Dhanani’s (2005) survey of British financial managers suggests that they view dividends
as impacting on value, although via signalling and tax clientele effects rather than
through governance, agency or capital market considerations.
The second explanation for a positive impact of dividend payments is that existing
models of value may overstate the impact, or even suggest a positive impact when none
exists. We might expect this to happen under a number of different scenarios. Firstly,
if we fail to effectively model expectations about future cash flows, and dividends are
correlated with those expectations, dividends could appear to positively affect value
when they are only acting as a proxy for expectations (Clubb, 2013). Secondly, if our
underlying model is not linear but we impose linearity on the data, the significance
of any of the variables, including dividends, might be misrepresented. Thirdly, both
Stark (1997) and Pope andWang (2005) point out that if components of earnings have
different time-series characteristics, they should have different value relevance. Clubb
(2013) similarly hypothesises that an undefined “core” earnings construct may indicate
value. If dividends are correlated with components of earnings that have high value
relevance, and if we do not model those components explicitly, dividends may appear
to be value relevant. Fourthly, Pope and Wang (2005) and Clubb (2013) also argue
that dividends will attract a more positive coefficient where accounting is conservative
than where accounting is unbiased. Finally, Barth and Clinch (2009) show that if we
fail to control for size effects, any size related variable, such as dividends, may attract a
more positive coefficient than it would otherwise.
Our data confirm a clear association between value and both net income and
dividends. Figure 1 shows the average percentile of price scaled by book value across
ROE deciles and across dividend-to-book ratio deciles (plus an additional group
consisting of firms that do not pay dividends). The correlations between value and
both dividends and income become stronger if the non-linearities caused by zero-
dividend firms and negative income firms (concentrated in deciles one to three of
1 This has recently become open to debate and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006), Handley (2008) and
Clubb and Walker (2012) have reviewed the applicability of the original M&M hypothesis. These papers
identify circumstances where M&M may not hold and, in the case of Clubb and Walker (2012), they specify
some possible implications for accounting based valuation models. However, these papers imply a relaxation
of the M&M restrictions.
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Figure 1
Market-to-book Percentile by Return-on-equity Decile and Dividends-to-book Decile
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The chart shows the average market-to-book (mvt) percentile for each decile of return-on-equity (nit) and
decile of dividends-to-book (dt), plus a zero category for firms not paying dividends. The variables are
calculated across the full dataset of 18,045 cases and the percentile score is not weighted but is a simple
average of the 10 (or 11 in the case of dividends-to-book ratio) categories, thereby ensuring that each
percentile score is comparable with the next.
ROE and plus the additional group consisting of firms that do not pay dividends)
are removed from the analysis. A fundamental question for our research is whether
dividends are still correlated with value when we control for income and other control
variables that effectively predict profitability.
When we apply the standard approach to our sample of UK firms drawn from
1990 to 2011 we find that the strong positive coefficient on dividends found by
earlier studies is repeated. However, when we focus on a model where we can
reliably incorporate estimates of future profitability by a) restricting our sample
to profitable dividend-paying firms, b) incorporating a measure of “other infor-
mation” not included in the accounting variables, and c) segmenting the net
income figure into a relatively permanent “core” and a more transient compo-
nent, we find that dividends no longer appear to be value relevant. We also show
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that dividends are positively associated with other information and core earnings
and are incrementally value relevant if these dimensions are excluded but not
otherwise.
Our results cannot prove the negative – that dividends are not value relevant. In-
deed we find sub-samples where marginal value relevance appears to remain. However,
it is clear that the strong relationship between dividends and value is only apparent
where the model does not adequately capture expected profitability. We are able
to model profitability but only for a sample restricted to profitable dividend-paying
firms, although these observations still represent 58.6% of our original sample. Our
interpretation is that the accounting-based valuation model is unreliable when applied
to the full sample, and researchers should be careful when using valuation models of
this type to examine the effect of information or firm characteristics on value. We
demonstrate this by estimating the value relevance of capital expenditure where the
results fluctuate from strongly significant positive value relevance to insignificant as
the model’s ability to capture expected profitability improves.
2. PREVIOUS EVIDENCE ON DIVIDENDS AND VALUE
Accounting-based valuation models typically assume that the value of a firm is
described by the residual income valuation model, founded on the assumption that
a) price is given by the discounted value of expected dividends, and b) accounting
is described by the clean surplus relationship (Peasnell, 1982; and Ohlson, 1995).
Thus:
mvt =
∞∑
t=1
R−s E t[dt+s] = bvt +
∞∑
t=1
R−s E t
[
xat+s
]
where mvt is price, R is one plus the cost of capital, Et denotes expectations, dt is
dividends including all capital contributions or dispersions, bvt is the book value of
equity and xta abnormal earnings defined as xt − r·bvt−1 where xt is clean surplus
earnings and r the cost of equity capital. In this model, paying dividends reduces the
concurrent book value of equity but does not affect concurrent earnings.
As the book value of equity (bvt) is known the valuation-modelling problem is to
derive a theoretically convincing and empirically robust model of the present value
of expected abnormal earnings (PVAE). Many accounting models of value claim
consistency with the seminal Ohlson (1995) paper which, based on an assumed linear
information dynamics, implies the following:
mvt = (1 − k)bvt + k(ϕnit − (dt + oct)) + αvt
where mvt, bvt, nit, dt, oct and ν t are defined as market value, book value of equity,
net income, dividends, other capital transactions and other information, respectively.
In the Ohlson paper, dividends and other capital are not separated and are treated
as one variable. Other information is that data, other than the defined accounting
variables, containing incremental information relevant to the time series behaviour
of abnormal earnings. k, ϕ and α are parameters which vary with the cost of
C© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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capital and the autocorrelation of both abnormal earnings and other information.2
Although influential, Ohlson (1995) is a sparse model that assumes that accounting
is unbiased and that future abnormal earnings are predicted only by a) current
abnormal earnings, and b) other information. The model has nevertheless been a
starting point for many empirical papers. For example, Hand and Landsman (2005)
estimate:
mvit = a0 + a1bvit + a2niit + a3dit + a4ocit + e it
without variables representing other information, and:
mvit = b0 + b1bvit + b2niit + b3dit + b4ocit + b5vit + b6fniit + e it
incorporating the portion of analysts’ forecasts not predicted by an autoregressive
model of earnings (ν t), and analysts’ forecast of one-year ahead earnings (fnit+1)
to represent two alternative formulations of other information. This approach splits
Ohlson’s (1995) total dividends variable into two components, dividends and other
capital transactions, and incorporates two indicators of Ohlson’s other information,
(ν t and fnit), but is otherwise a direct empirical analogy of Ohlson’s theoretical model
of value. Other papers, such as Akbar and Stark (2003), Pope and Wang (2005)3 and
Clubb (2013), have proposed models that are not explicitly founded on Ohlson’s
model but that lead to similar empirical specifications, although with some substantive
differences. These differences include variation in the way other information is
modelled, if at all; choices regarding the inclusion or not of other capital changes
and whether to split this into repurchases and new share issues; variation in the
specification of earnings, particularly whether to identify research and development
expenditure separately or not; and whether to identify core earnings separately
from comprehensive earnings. The implications of these alternative approaches are
discussed in section 3.
Despite the differences in models, estimation techniques and test statistics, the
evidence from earlier studies is broadly consistent. Using a pooled cross-section
and time-series for 1987–1995 for UK firms, and without variables to model other
information, Rees (1997) estimates significant coefficients on dividends in the range
10–13 (after adjusting for the impact of the dividend payment on the book value
of equity). Despite increasing sophistication in model specification, similar results
are found by Fama and French (1998), Hand and Landsman (2005), Pinkowitz
et al. (2006) and Dittmar et al. (2007) for US firms, Giner and Rees (1999) for
Spanish firms and Akbar and Stark (2003), Poletti Hughes (2008), Dedman et al.
(2009), Gregoriou (2010) and Dedman et al. (2012) for British firms. In all cases
the core results reveal coefficients on dividends that are significant and positive
and inconsistent with dividend displacement. In addition, the evidence shows that
where research and development expenditure is separated from other income it is
2 ϕ is R/(R − 1), k is (R − 1) · ω/(R − ω) and α is R/(R − ω) · (R − γ ) and R is 1 plus the cost of
capital, ω the autocorrelation coefficient on abnormal earnings and γ the autocorrelation coefficient on
other information.
3 Pope and Wang (2005) initially specify a model without reliance on Ohlson (1995) but then develop
an analysis of the expected coefficients based on a particular case of Ohlson’s (1995) linear information
dynamics.
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typically robustly positive and significant (Green et al., 1996; Akbar and Stark, 2003;
Dedman et al., 2012; and Shah et al., 2009), although some papers report weaker
results (Franzen and Radhakrisnan, 2009); where dividends are separated from other
(net) capital contributions the dividend coefficient increases and the other capital
contributions coefficient falls but may remain significantly positive (Lo and Lys, 2000;
Akbar and Stark, 2003; Shah et al., 2009; Oswald, 2008; Dedman et al., 2012; and
Hand and Landsman, 2005); where only loss-making firms are considered, dividends
are positively priced if the coefficient on book value is allowed to vary between high
and low R&D intensity firms and between dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying
firms (Jiang and Stark, 2013); and where measures representing other information
are introduced, albeit computed in various ways, they tend to be statistically significant
and can impact on the estimates of other variables’ coefficients (Akbar and Stark,
2003; Hand and Landsman, 2005; and Dedman et al., 2009). Other less frequent
findings include evidence that advertising expenditure (Shah et al., 2009), capital
expenditure (Rees, 1997; Dedman et al., 2009; and Dedman et al., 2012), international
diversification (Garrod and Rees, 1998) and leverage, measured as either debt (Rees,
1997) or interest payments (Fama and French, 1998), can significantly impact on
value.
However, Lo and Lys (2000) present evidence that suggests the results referred
to above may have been driven by the choice of scaling variable. For example, Rees
(1997) deflates the model by number of shares in issue, Fama and French (1998) by
the book value of total assets and Hand and Landsman (2005) use firm level, i.e.,
unscaled, variables. The Lo and Lys (2000) results suggest that the coefficients on
dividends and on other capital contributions are sensitive to choices about scaling.
Where the model is scaled by opening market value (or if a size-related control variable
is included), coefficients on dividends and other capital contributions are negative,
whereas both are positive if the model is estimated at the firm level (as in Hand
and Landsman, 2005) and the coefficients on dividends are positive when using the
number of shares as the deflator (as in Rees, 1997). The Lo and Lys (2000) results
are consistent with Goncharov and Veenman’s (2013) more recent evidence from the
US. However, Akbar and Stark (2003) and Dedman et al. (2009) revisit the problem
using British data and find that coefficients on dividends are reliably positive whether
the model is estimated on data deflated by opening or closing book value, sales or
number of shares. They also find that coefficients on other capital contributions are
reliably negative. For a sample of unprofitable British firms, Jiang and Stark (2013)
also report similar results using opening total assets or current book value as deflators.
Akbar and Stark (2003) conclude that “deflators have no impact on results relating to the
relationship between dividends and market value in the UK” (2003, p. 1224). Rees (2005) also
reviews the impact of deflators when discussing Hand and Landsman’s (2005) work.
He concludes that their approach, which uses undeflated values, produces robust
results, but results that are dominated by large firms and insensitive to the many small
firms that may provide insight into different determinants of dividend valuation. More
recently Barth and Clinch (2009) have demonstrated that valuation models can be
sensitive to the choice of deflator but both number of shares (despite the lack of
any theoretical justification) and closing book value of equity tend to provide reliable
results. Shen and Stark (2011, p. 3) comment that current book value is “the strongest
overall performer” as the deflator when using UK data and out-of-sample valuation errors
as the choice criterion.
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Hand and Landsman’s (2005) results cast further light on the role of dividends in
valuation. They show that dividends are positively valued unless the model incorpo-
rates analysts’ forecasts and forecast error. They suggest that their results are evidence
of mispricing. Their results might also be interpreted as confirming that dividends
provide information on future earnings that is not available in a model that simply
incorporates earnings and book value of equity variables. Dividends remain influential
when earnings forecasts are incorporated, possibly because the forecasts are flawed
and dividends provide information concerning the forecast error. These results do
not rule out the possibility that dividends provide evidence on other valuation-relevant
variables, such as earnings beyond t + 1.
The research evidence to date clearly shows that accounting valuation models
typically find a highly significant and strong positive relationship between dividends
and value. This could be explained by: a) a causal relationship between dividends
and value; b) dividends having incremental association with future abnormal earnings;
c) an assumption that the market is inefficient with respect to dividends; or d) model
misspecification.
3. RESEARCH METHOD
(i) Modelling Market Value
Dividend value relevance may be driven by a causal impact of dividends on value or
a predictive association where dividends do not cause a change in value but help to
model it. If our models are consistent with ∂mvt/∂dt = −1, then dividends do not
have value relevance, given the competing information set. Under these circumstances
dividends tell us nothing about value that is not reflected in other information
variables in the model. Dividends may still impact on value if the value change caused
by dividend payment has been captured by the competing information set. However, if
∂mvt/∂dt = −1, and the information included in the model is restricted to information
available before dividends became known, then dividends exhibit both predictive
and causal irrelevance. In our models of value we initially restrict the variables used
to accounting information from year t, which, save for the book value of equity, is
independent of dividends at time t. Our tests of the statistical significance of dividends
allow for the impact of dividends on equity. In subsequent developments we will
include estimates of core net income and other information where both are known
at time t, although our estimates use all available data including that from subsequent
years to produce the most reliable estimates. To ensure that the use of data from
periods following t does not introduce a bias into the our results we also test the impact
of estimating core net income and other information using only data available at or
before time t.
Following Stark (1997), Akbar and Stark (2003) and Pope and Wang (2005), we
use a straightforward valuation model where market value (mvt) is initially assumed to
be a function of a vector of value relevant accounting variables (zt). The accounting
variables are assumed to be known at the same time that dividends (dt) are known and
dividends do not affect any other explanatory variables except for the direct effect
on equity of dividend transactions. Assuming that zt includes book value of equity
at t, then the accounting variables will be value relevant if they predict the present
C© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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value of abnormal earnings, which implies they forecast abnormal earnings or the
discount rate. Akbar and Stark (2003) specify the information set zt as book value
(bvt), net income (nit), research and development expenditure (rdt), dividends (dt)
and other capital contributions (oct), all measured at time t.4 Thenmarket valuemay be
estimated as:
mvit = α0 + α1bvit + α2niit + α3r dit + α4dit + α5ocit + e it (1)
The variables are deflated by book value of equity at t and thus the α0 coefficient
is estimated on 1/bvt and α1, the book value coefficient, is based on the constant.
The Akbar and Stark (2003) model makes no predictions regarding the value
of coefficients in equation (1) but displacement for dividends, and other capital
contributions, implies −α1 + α4 = −1, −α1 + α5 = −1, and therefore α4 − α5 = 0,
after allowing for the concurrent change in the book value of equity.5
The third constraint above is not a direct test of displacement but previous studies
have generated more reliable estimates of the value impact of non-dividend capital
contributions than for dividends. We therefore use this relatively robust estimate of
the impact of capital changes as a benchmark for the dividend impact. Dedman
et al. (2010) show that the impact of dividends can be very different from that of
other capital changes, but that capital contributions, special dividends and share
repurchases, which collectively make up our other capital measure, all have a similar
impact on value.
Thus our first model uses the specific set of value drivers identified by Akbar and
Stark (2003) where “currently observable information will be relevant in valuation if it is
relevant in forecasting future abnormal earnings” (Pope and Wang, 2009, p. 389), even
though, in an empirical setting, value relevance could also come from forecasting
discount rates. Dividends will exhibit displacement if the net effect on value of the
book value and dividend coefficient is −1, but for equation (1) dividend displacement
is not necessarily expected. Prior evidence suggests it is unlikely and we view model
1 as lacking effective indicators of future profitability. We next incorporate other
information variables based on firm valuation at t− 1 (Akbar and Stark, 2003) and core
earnings at time t (Pope and Wang, 2009; and Clubb, 2013) to improve the model’s
capture of information regarding future earnings.
Hand and Landsman (2005) develop an estimate of other information based on
Ohlson (2001) that is designed to capture information from analysts’ forecasts about
future abnormal income not contained in the time-series of abnormal earnings.
Conversely, Akbar and Stark (2003) incorporate a measure of other information
that can be seen as reflecting all value-relevant other information. They estimate the
valuation error at time t − 1 using equation (1). Whilst this is theoretically convincing
4 As we partition earnings into various segments it is convenient to maintain one definition of earnings as
earnings after interest and tax. Thus in our model the impact on value of R&D expenditure is a1 plus a3
rather than a3 as in Akbar and Stark (2003). We also segment net income into transient and core income
and include the variable (cnit) to identify our estimate of core income. The value impact of core income
would be a1 plus a2 in equation (1).
5 The indirect test of value relevance is required because the payment of dividends, or other capital changes,
has a concurrent impact on the book value of equity. The value impact is therefore the sum of the dividend
(or other capital) coefficient less the book value coefficient and, if dividend displacement is to hold, should
equal minus one.
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it has some practical difficulties.6 Firstly, as the measure of other information is a
function of lagged variables from our valuation model, the coefficients in our test
equation may be affected by our choice of the exact specification of the lagged
model. Secondly, our analysis shows that the conventional valuation model given
in equation (1) is sensitive to decisions concerning the sample. Consequently, it is
not obvious what would be the correct sample or how we should estimate other
information when our results would suggest that the model is unstable. Finally, the
computation of other information using a lagged version of model 1 tends to generate
outliers. We therefore use a version of Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) model of pricing
deviations including industry and year variation. This produces an other information
proxy (oi), which is derived independently from the income statement variables in the
valuation model, can be modelled using all firms with a positive book value of equity,
and produces a metric which is close to normally distributed.
Using the simplest version of the Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) model, the other
information variable is the standardised residual from log(mvit−1) = δ0 + δ1log(bvit−1)
+ industry · δi + year · δy + eit−1 where industry and year are dummy variables
representing FT industry codes and annual dummies. We chose to use standardised
residuals to reduce the weight attached to risky estimates but for our dataset the
results are almost identical whether we use the residual or standardised residual. The
results presented are based on estimates from the pooled dataset. We are concerned
to produce the best estimate of oi at time t and use industry and year specific dummies
to model variation in the market-to-book relationship and this includes information
derived from time periods following t. We find that results using annual estimates of
oi based only on data from t − 1 are consistent with the results presented. With the
inclusion of our estimate of other information the valuation model then becomes:
mvit = α∗0 + α∗1bvit + α∗2niit + α∗3r dit + α∗4dit + α∗5ocit + α∗6oiit + e i (2)
We then define core net income (cni) as the earnings that would be expected for the
firm i in year t, in the absence of information concerning idiosyncratic circumstances
that might impact on the market as a whole or the firm in particular. We view
core net income as a segmentation of earnings into core and transitory components
consistent with Stark’s (1997) equation (3a) or Pope and Wang’s (2005) equation
(4). We estimate this as cniit = ø0 + ø1fy0it + ø2fniit−1 where fy0it is the actual earnings
figure at time t as available through the I/B/E/S system at time t (after adjusting for
discontinued operations, extraordinary charges and other non−operating items and
made available immediately after the earnings figure is published) and fnit−1 is the
expectation (analysts’ mean forecast) at time t − 1 of net income at t. Thus the slope
coefficients are estimated from a regression of this year’s net income (niit) on both the
prior forecast of this year’s net income (fniit−1) and this year’s base earnings (fy0it). As
for other information we estimate core net income using all available information from
the pooled sample including data from periods after t = 1. The results are consistent
with those presented if we run annual regressions at t − 1 or restrict the model to
either fy0t or fnit−1.
6 If we use the Akbar and Stark (2003) approach to estimating oi, and after making reasonable assumptions
about model specification and outlier deletion, we are able to generate results that are consistent with the
results presented. However, the results based on the Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) approach are more robust
and simpler, both theoretically and empirically.
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We estimate equation (3) with and without core income as the impact of the
introduction of this variable is instructive:
mvit = α∗∗0 + α∗∗1 bvit + α∗∗2 niit + α∗∗3 r dit + α∗∗4 dit + α∗∗5 ocit
+α∗∗6 oiit + α∗∗7 cniit + e it (3)
Equation (3) supplements the basic model 1 with two types of other information.
Both are expected to exhibit value relevance if they have incremental predictive
ability for abnormal earnings (or for discount rates). This is not an exhaustive
model and line items that identify different time-series behaviour of components
of earnings, or identify different value relevance under-different circumstances, may
have incremental value relevance (see, for example, Jiang and Stark, 2013). However,
the model incorporates the standard variables included in recent research and is
consistent with recent theoretical papers (such as Pope and Wang, 2005; Clubb and
Walker, 2012; and Clubb, 2013).
(ii) Empirical Models and Theoretical Expectations
The theoretical models of accounting and value are necessarily sparse and may not
necessarily describe empirical relationships. However a review of the linear informa-
tion dynamics models may provide useful insights into the interactions between the
variables used in the models above. Equation 1 above is consistent with Ohlson (1995)
if we assume: i) that the accounting variables are sufficient to effectively model market
value and hence there is no role for “other information”; ii) that partitioning total
capital contributions into dividends and other capital contributions has no theoretical
impact; and iii) partitioning net income into research and development, transitory and
core net income also has no theoretical impact. However, in Ohlson’s (1995) analysis,
expected abnormal earnings is a function only of current abnormal earnings and other
information which contains only information independent of abnormal earnings.
Clubb’s (2013) analysis supplements Ohlson’s (1995) model by initially allowing a
role for dividends in predicting future abnormal earnings. His model of value, here
adapted to incorporate total earnings rather than abnormal earnings, is:
mvt = (1 + β − γ r ) · bvt + (β − γ r ) · dt + (γ + γ r ) · ni
where β = ωd/(R− (ωd + ωae)), γ = ωae/(R− (ωd + ωae)), ωd and ωae are the coefficients
on dividends and abnormal earnings, respectively, when predicting abnormal earnings
at t + 1, R = 1 + r and r is the cost of capital. It is interesting that Clubb (2013)
concludes that dividends may attract a positive coefficient in equation (1) but still
exhibit dividend displacement. As in Pope and Wang (2005), the coefficient on
dividends is positively associated with accounting conservatism, although in Pope and
Wang’s (2005) model this would not be consistent with dividend displacement.
Clubb (2013) also proposes a role for an “undefined” variable that can either
be thought of as a prediction of abnormal earnings or a basis from which to make
that prediction which he views as “recurring abnormal earnings”. We treat both core
net income and our other information variable as indicators of recurring abnormal
earnings. Core net income is an explicit attempt to model the expected earnings in
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time t and is consistent with Pope and Wang’s (2005) core net income. Our other
information variable captures the mis−valuation based on accounting values at time t
that is, by definition, a function of expected abnormal earnings. The introduction of
better indicators of income into the model implies a reduction in the coefficient on
dividends and book value.
(iii) Impact of Dividends and Other Capital Changes on Core Earnings and Other
Information
We use two indicators of expected abnormal earnings in equation (3): a) core net
income for year t, and b) other information. In equations (4) and (5) we identify the
link between our estimate of a) core earnings, and b) other information with the other
components in the valuation model. This estimation process is in part redundant as
the coefficients can be calculated from the impact of introducing either core earnings
or other information into the valuation models. However, estimating the relationship
directly is convenient and identifies the statistical significance of the coefficients.
Hence, we estimate:
cniit = β0 + β1bvit + β2niit + β3r dit + β4dit + β5ocit + β6oiit + e it (4)
In equation (5) we replace the dependent variable core net income with the other
information variable (oit):
oiit = β∗0 + β∗1bvit + β∗2niit + β∗3r dit + β∗4dit + β∗5ocit + β∗7 cniit + e it (5)
Here we are concerned to test whether there is a relationship between the level
of dividends or other capital contributions and either core net income and other
information. As both dividends and capital contributions also directly impact on
equity we allow for the direct impact via the dividends coefficient and the indirect
impact via the book value of equity coefficient. Thus, for both equation (4) and (5),
insignificance relationships between both dividend and other capital contribution and
both core net income and other information implies −β1 + β4 = 0, −β1 + β5 = 0 and
hence β4 − β5 = 0.
(iv) Modelling Earnings Expectations
In equations (6) and (7) we examine the predictive ability of our accounting measures
of value for earnings expectations. We have two available measures of earnings
expectations: actual earnings in period t + 1 (nit+1) and forecasts in period t of
earnings in t + 1 (fnit+1). Neither measure captures long run expectations of earnings;
the former measures earnings expectations plus unexpected earnings and the latter is
contaminated by well-established biases in analysts’ forecasts (Ramnath et al., 2008).
Whilst we expect analysts’ forecasts to be a better measure of long-run profitability, we
treat the outcome as an empirical issue and examine the role of accounting variables
in predicting the two measures of earnings expectations. It is not clear why any of
the independent variables examined in equations (1), (2) and (3) would have value
relevance if they did not have predictive value for expected earnings. Neither of
our dependent variables in equations (6) and (7) below fully captures the value of
C© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Table 1
Sample Formation Procedure
Initial cases with mvt, bvt, nit, rdt, dt, oct available 29,303
Less cases with negative book value of equity 1,742
27,561
Non-missing variables for the basic model less accounting year
longer than/shorter than 1 year plus/minus 3 months
369
=Total number of cases before outlier deletion 27,192
less outliers on all variables simultaneously 1,292
Total number of observations in sample 25,900
with other information estimates available 21,896
with core income estimates available 13,262
Profitable, dividend-paying observations 15,185
with other information estimates available 13,491
with core income estimates available 10,005
Note:
The variables are defined as follows: mvt is market value of equity six months after the year end, dt is ordinary
dividends, nit is net income, oct is other capital changes such as stock issues or repurchases, rdt is research
and development expenditure and all variables are deflated by the closing book value of equity. The initial
sample is drawn from all firms available on the Datastream database for the UK, active and dead firms, for
the years 1990–2011.
expected earnings but it is difficult to see why there would not be a strong relationship
across a broad sample between year t + 1 earnings and the value of future abnormal
earnings:
niit+1 = γ0 + γ1bvit + γ2niit + γ3r dit + γ4dit + γ5ocit + γ6oiit + γ7cniit + e it (6)
fniit+1 = γ ∗0 + γ ∗1 bvit + γ ∗2 niit + γ ∗3 r dit + γ ∗4 dit + γ ∗5 ocit + γ ∗6 oiit + γ ∗7 cniit + e it . (7)
The expectation is that the slope coefficient on dividends will be positive and
significant in a model of t + 1 earnings, whether measured as actual or expectations
(equations (6) and (7), where: a) the model includes firms with losses, as net income
will prove to be a poor indicator of subsequent net income; or b) where core net
income or other information are excluded, as both variables are expected to be
associated with subsequent net income. For equations (6) and (7) if dividend and
other capital contributions have no impact on expected earnings this implies −γ 1 +
γ 4 = 0, −γ 1 + γ 5 = 0 and hence γ 4 − γ 5 = 0.7
(v) Data
The sample derivation is reported in Table 1. The full sample contains 25,900 cases
drawn from UK industrial and commercial quoted companies during the period 1990
to 2011 (after deletion of 4,037 cases with missing values, 369 with accounting periods
7 There is good reason to expect that capital changes will have an impact on subsequent earnings, and
hence forecasts of earnings, equal to the change in capital times the cost of equity. However, we are
concerned here with determining whether dividends or other capital contributions have a significant impact
on expected earnings. It is also the case that the net coefficient suggested by the cost of capital is sufficiently
small that we are unlikely to be able to determine a statistically significant difference from zero.
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not falling within 9 to 15 months,8 1,742 cases with negative book value of equity and
1,292 cases with outliers). Outliers are defined as the extreme top and bottom 1% of
each variable except where the variable is truncated at zero. The sample is restricted to
21,896 cases where we require estimates of other information (oi) and to 13,262 where
we additionally require estimates of core net income (cni). For some tests we restrict
our sample to cases with positive net income and positive dividends, which limits the
original sample to 15,185, the other information sample to 13,491, and where core net
income is additionally required to 10,005.
The data are collected from Thomson Financial Datastream and the accounting
numbers originate fromWorldscope whereas the forecast numbers are from I/B/E/S.
nit is net income available to common (Worldscope code WC01751), rdt is research
and development expenditure (WC01201), dt is ordinary dividends9 (WC05376) and
oct is other capital changes such as issues (WC04251) or repurchases (WC04751).
For accounting periods ending before the 20th January 2007, UK firms had up to
six months after the financial year-end to publish accounting data and this was
reduced to four months for accounting periods ending after that date following the
implementation of the Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC. To maintain consistency
we collect the market value of equity (mvt) six months after the financial year-end. We
deflate all variables by current book value of equity (WC03501).
As we have curtailed the sample for some of our tests, we present statistics to
demonstrate that our final samples are similar to the full sample in their important
characteristics. The descriptive characteristics of the full and profitable dividend-
paying sample are broadly similar although of course the means of dividends and net
income are higher.
In Table 2 we report both Pearson product moment and Spearman rank correla-
tions between the variables of interest. Relatively high positive Pearson correlations
are observed between market value (mvt) and the deflated intercept (1/bvt), dividends
(dt) and other information (oit) for the full sample. When rank correlations are
used, strong correlations are reported for dividends (dt), other capital changes, (oct)
net income (nit), and other information (oit). For the sample restricted to positive
dividend payers, the correlations are higher for dividends, net income and other
information. This might be expected given the non-linearities between value and both
dividends and profits demonstrated in Figure 1.
In the second panel of Table 2, we see very similar descriptive statistics for the
I/B/E/S sample as for the full sample. The same pattern is also repeated across the
correlation matrices in panels 1 and 2. The new core net income variable (cnit) is
strongly correlated with the market value for both samples and for both correlation
methods. The only important difference between the panel 1 and panel 2 descriptive
statistics is that net income has a relatively high product moment correlation with
8 A more restrictive rule on the length of the accounting year makes little difference to the sample or the
results. A plus or minus 15 day cut would reduce the sample by only 1.8%. Moreover, it is not uncommon to
observe accounting year-end switches within this interval, with some firms switching in considerably longer
or shorter periods (Garrod and Valentincic, 2005).
9 IFRS became mandatory for all listed companies in the EU for accounting periods beginning on or after
1st January 2005. This changed the way firms account for dividends paid. Under SSAP 17, dividends were
accounted for on an accrual basis. Under IFRS, recognising dividends declared after the end of reporting
period is prohibited (IAS 10 – Events after the reporting period). Instead, such dividends are accounted for
in the period in which they are paid. Our results are not sensitive to this change.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
mvt 1/bvt dt oct nit rdt oit
Panel 1: Full Sample
Full Sample
Mean 2.805 0.169 0.046 -0.124 −0.016 0.028 −0.098
Sd 3.798 0.569 0.061 0.316 0.485 0.083 0.934
min 0.139 0.000 0.000 −2.464 −5.715 −0.047 −4.711
max 50.717 23.810 0.557 0.240 1.147 0.708 2.843
Profitable Dividend-paying Sample
Mean 2.743 0.068 0.069 −0.049 0.170 0.019 0.088
Sd 3.265 0.141 0.062 0.184 0.135 0.055 0.746
min 0.139 0.000 0.000 −2.442 0.000 0.000 −3.851
max 50.717 4.202 0.557 0.240 1.147 0.708 2.827
Full Sample – Correlation Matrix
mvt 1.000 0.088 0.222 −0.235 0.371 0.144 0.682
1/bvt 0.254 1.000 −0.352 −0.021 −0.258 −0.119 −0.127
dt 0.206 −0.108 1.000 0.144 0.575 0.051 0.321
oct −0.178 −0.156 0.185 1.000 0.082 −0.084 −0.237
nit 0.003 −0.323 0.273 0.248 1.000 0.013 0.441
rdt 0.175 0.027 −0.017 −0.100 −0.134 1.000 0.091
oit 0.488 0.000 0.337 −0.099 0.310 0.066 1.000
Profitable Dividend–paying Sample – Correlation Matrix
mvt 1.000 0.048 0.497 −0.239 0.660 0.145 0.731
1/bvt 0.173 1.000 −0.016 0.096 0.067 −0.178 −0.111
dt 0.436 0.112 1.000 −0.058 0.556 0.152 0.460
oct −0.133 −0.052 0.021 1.000 −0.132 −0.080 −0.233
nit 0.609 0.179 0.618 −0.086 1.000 0.100 0.568
rdt 0.192 −0.005 0.143 −0.015 0.153 1.000 0.107
oit 0.579 −0.049 0.441 −0.084 0.532 0.121 1.000
Panel 2: I/B/E/S Sample
I/B/E/S Sample
Mean 2.555 0.046 0.060 −0.046 0.097 0.029 0.097 0.055
Sd 2.632 0.085 0.061 0.153 0.212 0.076 0.109 0.813
min 0.189 0.000 0.000 −1.497 −1.835 0.000 −0.613 −4.681
max 33.702 2.445 0.622 0.287 1.198 0.708 0.600 2.810
Profitable Dividend–paying I/B/E/S Sample
Mean 2.654 0.036 0.071 −0.033 0.167 0.020 0.167 0.170
Sd 2.532 0.061 0.059 0.131 0.115 0.054 0.096 0.710
min 0.193 0.000 0.000 −1.497 0.000 0.000 −0.450 −3.702
max 33.702 0.957 0.622 0.287 1.198 0.708 0.756 2.809
I/B/E/S Sample – Correlation Matrix
mvt 1.000 0.077 0.374 −0.228 0.531 0.153 0.558 0.705
1/bvt 0.123 1.000 −0.116 0.017 −0.045 −0.075 0.017 −0.061
dt 0.331 −0.039 1.000 0.033 0.512 0.044 0.530 0.378
oct −0.096 −0.047 0.153 1.000 −0.040 −0.086 −0.102 −0.215
nit 0.281 −0.114 0.358 0.125 1.000 0.001 0.682 0.513
rdt 0.198 0.094 −0.017 −0.048 −0.162 1.000 0.039 0.080
cnit 0.379 0.022 0.474 0.080 0.536 −0.090 1.000 0.596
oit 0.548 −0.019 0.377 −0.075 0.417 0.067 0.456 1.000
Profitable Dividend–paying I/B/E/S Sample – Correlation Matrix
mvt 1.000 0.110 0.488 −0.230 0.649 0.145 0.713 0.720
1/bvt 0.105 1.000 0.038 0.021 0.106 −0.141 0.047 −0.027
dt 0.436 0.098 1.000 −0.030 0.541 0.155 0.567 0.451
oct −0.074 −0.026 0.096 1.000 −0.103 −0.072 −0.137 −0.206
nit 0.629 0.149 0.594 0.018 1.000 0.094 0.830 0.572
rdt 0.206 0.027 0.141 0.018 0.128 1.000 0.127 0.096
cnit 0.651 0.100 0.586 −0.014 0.826 0.174 1.000 0.641
oit 0.598 −0.018 0.428 −0.068 0.545 0.116 0.595 1.000
Note:
mvt is the market value of common shares six months after the accounting year end, 1/bvt is one divided by the book
value of equity (the book value of equity is expressed in millions of pounds throughout the paper), nit is net income, rdt
is research and development, dt is ordinary dividends, oct is other capital changes such as issues or repurchases, oit is our
estimate of other information, and cnit is our estimate of core net income. All variables are deflated by current book value
of equity at t. The product moment correlations are below the diagonal and rank correlations are above the diagonal.
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market value when loss making firms are included for the I/B/E/S sample (ρ = 0.281)
but the statistic is negligible for the full sample (ρ = 0.003). This does lead to a higher
slope coefficient on net income in our initial valuation models but has no discernable
impact on the test variable coefficients.
4. RESULTS
(i) Tests of Displacement for Dividends and Other Capital Changes
In Table 3 we report tests of the impact of: a) restricting the sample to the I/B/E/S
dataset which we use in all subsequent tables; b) excluding loss-making and zero-
dividend firms; and c) introducing other information. For each regression we test
whether the coefficient on dividends less that on book value is significantly different
from−1, whether the coefficient on other capital changes less that on book value is sig-
nificantly different from −1, and whether the coefficient on dividends is significantly
different from that on other capital changes. For all four models the results for the
full and I/B/E/S samples are broadly similar although there is a higher percentage of
profitable dividend paying firms (79%) in the I/B/E/S sample than in the full sample
(67%). The coefficient on net income is consequently lower for the full sample than
for the I/B/E/S sample when loss-making firms are included. Throughout Table 3 the
estimated coefficients on the control variables are consistent with prior research.
Where the models include firms with negative earnings (models 1, 3, 5 and 7)
the coefficients on book value and dividends are positive and significant whilst the
coefficients on other capital are negative and significant. We designate model 1,
which includes the full sample and has neither other information nor core net
income included as explanatory variables, as the base model. In all instances, dividend
displacement is rejected, other capital displacement is rejected and equality of the
slope coefficients on dividends and other capital is rejected. The inclusion of other
information in models 5 and 7 results in significant positive slope coefficients on that
variable; the rejection of dividend and other capital displacement is maintained as is
the rejection of equality of coefficients on dividends and other capital changes.
Where loss-making firms are excluded (models 2, 4, 6 and 8) the coefficients on
book value are insignificantly different from zero when other information is excluded
from the model and positive and significant when other information is included.
The dividend coefficients are significant and positive when other information is
excluded and insignificantly positive when it is included. The coefficients on other
capital changes remain significantly negative in all cases. Although the coefficient
on dividends has been much reduced by excluding loss-making cases and firms not
paying dividends we reject dividend displacement for models 2, 4 and 8, but not
6. Other capital displacement is not rejected for model 2 but is in the other three
cases. Equality of coefficients on dividends and other capital changes is rejected in all
cases.
In two instances the full and I/B/E/S samples give different results. We reject other
capital changes displacement for model 4 (−1.836 − 0.117 = −1.953, p < 0.05) but
not for model 2 (−1.521 + 0.008 = −1.513, insignificant) and we reject dividend
displacement for model 8 (1.549 − 0.706 = 0.843, p > 0.05) but not for model 6
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DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE AND ACCOUNTING MODELS OF VALUE 661
T
ab
le
3
Va
lu
at
io
n
M
od
el
s
E
xc
lu
di
n
g
C
or
e
E
ar
n
in
gs
M
od
el
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
A
ll
I/
B
/E
/S
A
ll
I/
B
/E
/S
Sa
m
pl
e
A
ll
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
I/
B
/E
/S
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
A
ll
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
I/
B
/E
/S
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
1/
bv
t
1.
84
8*
**
1.
51
6*
*
3.
97
1*
**
0.
46
5
0.
99
4*
**
1.
35
5*
**
3.
18
0*
**
1.
42
8*
*
(6
.7
4)
(3
.0
8)
(6
.3
6)
(0
.9
5)
(4
.7
0)
(3
.7
9)
(8
.4
4)
(2
.7
1)
bv
t
1.
30
6*
**
−0
.0
08
50
1.
05
0*
**
0.
11
7
1.
84
1*
**
0.
79
6*
**
1.
62
5*
**
0.
70
6*
**
(1
4.
96
)
(0
.0
8)
(1
1.
86
)
(1
.4
0)
(1
6.
04
)
(6
.7
8)
(1
5.
16
)
(8
.0
7)
ni
t
0.
73
5*
**
12
.4
1*
**
2.
93
8*
**
11
.9
1*
**
−0
.1
47
8.
34
9*
**
0.
99
7*
**
8.
56
2*
**
(5
.3
2)
(1
4.
05
)
(8
.7
1)
(1
5.
10
)
(1
.1
0)
(1
1.
43
)
(3
.7
4)
(1
3.
28
)
rd
t
7.
59
3*
**
5.
77
6*
**
8.
02
4*
**
5.
65
8*
**
6.
02
0*
**
5.
81
0*
**
5.
99
0*
**
5.
41
3*
**
(7
.9
9)
(3
.9
7)
(7
.6
2)
(3
.8
9)
(7
.1
2)
(4
.4
1)
(6
.6
0)
(4
.2
2)
d t
15
.4
6*
**
5.
16
1*
**
12
.9
4*
**
4.
86
4*
**
7.
89
3*
**
1.
18
4
6.
84
1*
**
1.
54
9
(1
3.
61
)
(6
.0
0)
(1
3.
67
)
(4
.3
6)
(8
.4
1)
(1
.1
6)
(8
.3
2)
(1
.7
8)
oc
t
−2
.2
55
**
*
−1
.5
21
**
*
−2
.4
82
**
*
−1
.8
36
**
*
−1
.2
64
**
*
−1
.2
32
**
*
−1
.3
19
**
*
−1
.2
72
**
*
(1
2.
15
)
(4
.1
6)
(8
.8
1)
(4
.5
5)
(6
.0
0)
(4
.1
3)
(5
.1
5)
(4
.2
3)
oi
t
1.
34
4*
**
1.
35
8*
**
1.
40
3*
**
1.
25
9*
**
(1
0.
82
)
(9
.1
8)
(1
1.
74
)
(1
0.
33
)
N
25
,9
00
15
,1
85
17
,2
50
12
,1
00
21
,8
96
13
,4
91
15
,3
88
10
,9
56
ad
j.
R
2
0.
18
4
0.
39
8
0.
25
7
0.
45
9
0.
31
0
0.
46
5
0.
36
6
0.
50
8
F-
st
at
s.
:
a 4
−a
1
=
−1
17
1.
04
**
*
48
.6
5*
**
16
9.
06
**
*
26
.8
9*
**
49
.1
7*
**
1.
66
49
.1
8*
**
4.
31
*
a 5
−a
1
=
−1
15
5.
32
**
*
2.
52
84
.1
1*
**
6.
26
*
93
.1
0*
**
13
.0
9*
**
61
.1
2*
**
10
.2
4*
*
a 4
=
a 5
21
9.
25
**
*
45
.4
0*
**
19
9.
31
**
*
29
.1
8*
**
77
.8
4*
**
4.
73
*
74
.3
8*
**
9.
40
**
N
ot
es
:
T
h
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
de
fi
n
ed
as
fo
llo
w
s:
m
v t
is
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
co
m
m
on
sh
ar
es
si
x
m
on
th
s
af
te
r
th
e
ac
co
un
ti
n
g
ye
ar
en
d,
1/
bv
t
is
on
e
di
vi
de
d
by
th
e
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
,n
i t
is
n
et
in
co
m
e,
rd
t
is
re
se
ar
ch
an
d
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t,
d t
is
or
di
n
ar
y
di
vi
de
n
ds
,o
c t
is
ot
h
er
ca
pi
ta
lc
h
an
ge
s
su
ch
as
is
su
es
or
re
pu
rc
h
as
es
,a
n
d
oi
t
is
ou
r
es
ti
m
at
e
of
ot
h
er
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
.A
ll
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
de
fl
at
ed
by
cu
rr
en
tb
oo
k
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
at
t.
T
h
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
m
od
el
is
:
m
v i
t
=
α
0
+
α
1
bv
it
+
α
2
ni
it
+
α
3r
d i
t
+
α
4
d i
t
+
α
5
oc
it
+
α
6
oi
it
+
e i
t.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ar
e
po
ol
ed
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
2-
w
ay
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ye
ar
an
d
by
fi
rm
(P
et
er
se
n
,2
00
9)
.A
bs
ol
ut
e
va
lu
es
of
th
e
t-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
.
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
n
ts
or
F-
st
at
is
ti
cs
th
at
ar
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
lly
si
gn
if
ic
an
ta
re
id
en
ti
fi
ed
by
*
=
p
<
0.
05
,*
*
=
p
<
0.
01
,*
**
=
p
<
0.
00
1.
C© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
662 REES AND VALENTINCIC
(1.184 − 0.796 = 0.308, insignificant). However, in both cases the differences between
the estimated impacts are statistically insignificant. Our interpretation is that the
full and I/B/E/S samples produce broadly similar results, which are close to the
statistically significant cut-off.
Thus, our initial results confirm that a model including loss-making firms and
excluding other information will generate results that are strongly inconsistent with
dividend displacement. Improving the information set in the models, by either
excluding loss-making firms or including another information variable, will move the
results towards dividend displacement and the combination produces results where
dividend displacement cannot be rejected, as in model 6, or is marginally rejected, as
in model 8. However, in models 6 and 8 we still clearly reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients on dividends and other capital changes are the same.
In Table 4 we investigate the impact of including estimates of “core earnings” in
models 3, 4, 7 and 8. We restrict the results to a consistent sample so that the impact of
including different variables can be separated from any change induced by changing
samples. In models 1, 2, 5 and 6, we present the results for the same models as in Table
3, excluding core earnings, but restricted to the core earnings sample. The coefficient
on core net income is positive and significant in models 3, 4, 7 and 8 and the inclusion
of core net income can be seen to reduce the coefficients on net income, dividends
and book value. As in Table 3, whenever either loss-making firms are included in the
sample or other information is excluded, dividend displacement is rejected. Other
capital displacement is not rejected in the one instance (model 4) where core net
income is included, loss makers are excluded and other information is also excluded.
In model 8, when core net income is included, loss-making firms are excluded and
other information is included, we cannot reject dividend displacement for dividends
or for other capital and nor can we reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on
dividends and other capital is the same. We designate model 8, in Table 4, as our
preferred model.
Our explanation of these results is that dividends are associated with future
profitability and will be positively valued where other indicators of profitability are
excluded. This will occur where loss-making firms are included and where effective
indicators of future profitability such as other information or core earnings are
excluded. We test this explanation in sections 4(iii) and 4(iv) below.
(ii) Sensitivity Tests10
(a) Alternative Estimation Procedures
In Tables 3 and 4 we report results based on pooled time-series and cross-sections with
two way clustered errors using firm and year as the clustering indicators (Petersen,
2009). However, a number of different approaches have been used in existing research
to estimate these models and we test the sensitivity of our results to: i) estimation
with coefficients and standard errors derived from annual OLS estimates (Fama
and MacBeth, 1973); ii) estimation with standard errors derived from bootstrapping
10 Tabulated results of the sensitivity tests are available from the authors or from early versions of the paper
available on SSRN.
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techniques; iii) estimation with coefficients and standard errors derived from a pooled
cross-section and time-series with annual dummies and standard errors clustered by
firm (Petersen, 2009); and iv) and a random effects panel data estimation.11 For these
alternative estimation procedures the dividend coefficients in our preferred model
(model 8 in Table 4) are 1.025, 0.352, 0.355 and 1.126, respectively and none are
estimated to be significantly different from zero. Only the random effects model
rejects dividend displacement, estimating a net effect of paying dividends on value of
0.899 (p < 0.01). The other capital changes coefficients are −0.695, 1.073, −0.931
and −0.841 and in all cases they are significantly different from zero at p < 0.01
or higher. For the Fama–MacBeth and bootstrapping approaches we reject other
capital displacement at p < 0.001 and p < 0.05 levels, respectively. The coefficient on
dividends is estimated to be significantly different from that on other capital changes
for the Fama–MacBeth, bootstrapping and random effects approaches at the p < 0.05,
p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 levels, respectively.
Thus, the alternative estimation approaches produce results that are broadly consis-
tent with those reported in Table 4. Dividends attract a positive insignificant coefficient
and save for the random effects approach dividend displacement cannot be rejected.
Other capital changes attract a significant negative coefficient that is more likely to be
inconsistent with other capital displacement. The coefficients on other capital and div-
idends are often significantly different but at marginal levels of statistical significance.
(b) Stability across Different Sub-samples
Our results suggest that dividend displacement cannot be reliably rejected across a
broad sample of companies with positive current net income when estimates of core
income and other information are incorporated into the model. This result does
not mean that dividends are not value relevant for some sub-samples. We investigate
four factors that might influence the value relevance of dividends: financial leverage,
measured as total debt to equity (Rees, 1997; and Fama and French, 1998); size,
measured by market capitalisation; value versus growth, measured as opening market-
to-book adjusted for industry differences (Pope and Wang, 2005; and Clubb, 2013);
and the expected conditional conservatism of the accounting system, measured by
the Khan and Watts conservatism index (Khan and Watts, 2009). The choice of
these four variables from the many available metrics we could use to segment the
sample is largely driven by Khan and Watts (2009), who show that size, leverage and
market-to-book capture many of the other dimensions which may be related to agency
and informational dimensions in our sample. These other dimensions include stock
market volatility, non-operating accruals, investment cycle, the probability of litigation,
probability of informed trading and firm age. The market-to-book variable and the
Khan and Watt (2009) indicator of conditional conservatism are also directly related
to the suggestion that the coefficient on dividends may be positively associated with
conservatism. We split the sample on an annual basis into two equal parts according to
the variable of interest and test for dividend and other capital relevance, and equality
of the dividend and other capital coefficients, for both sub-samples pooled across our
22 years of available data.
11 The Hausman test confirms that fixed effects and random effects panel data estimates are consistent.
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In total we have estimated both dividend and other capital displacement in eight
samples. In all cases, except for low conservatism firms, other capital is negative
and statistically significant and it is only for low value firms that we can reject other
capital displacement (p < 0.05). However, the estimated coefficient on dividends
is negative in four cases and positive in four, with only the positive result for high
conservatism firms significantly different from zero (p < 0.05). In the case of low
leverage firms (p < 0.05), low value firms (p < 0.05) and high conservatism firms (p <
0.01) dividend displacement is rejected. The result for low value (low opening market-
to-book) is surprising. Pope and Wang (2005) suggest that firms with conservative
accounting should have a high coefficient on dividends leading to a rejection of
dividend displacement. Clubb (2013) agrees that a high dividend coefficient might
be expected on dividends but not necessarily rejecting dividend displacement as a
compensating high coefficient on book value might also be found. However, the
explanation for this apparently perverse result is that for this sample the coefficients
on net income, core net income and other information are lower than those estimates
on all the other sub-samples. Thus, the rejection of dividend displacement for low
value firms, instead of the hypothesised rejection for high value firms, is driven by the
failure of the control variables to effectively model expected profitability. The evidence
reported here confirms that dividend displacement may not apply to all firms, with
three out of eight sub-samples rejecting dividend displacement. However, the results
are not sufficiently reliable to confirm or reject particular hypotheses regarding the
impact of firm characteristics on dividend displacement.
(c) Value and Firm Characteristics – Capital Expenditure
Our focus is to re-examine the evidence from accounting-based valuation models that
conflicts with theories of dividend irrelevance. However, these models have also been
used to test the value relevance of a variety of firm characteristics or management
actions and, given the instability of the dividends coefficients reported in Tables 3 and
4, we are concerned that the results for other coefficients may also be unstable. One
example that receives some support in earlier research is capital expenditure (Rees,
1997; Dedman et al., 2009). Whilst not receiving the level of empirical support or
theoretical justification to justify inclusion in the base models used in Tables 3 and
4, we use capital expenditure to test the reliability of the valuation model approach
in examining the value relevance of firm characteristics. We re-estimate equation (2)
with the addition of a capital expenditure variable. We test the model using: i) the
base model using the full I/B/E/S sample; ii) the sample reduced to profitable
dividend payers; iii) the full sample including our estimate of other information;
iv) the reduced sample including other information; and v) the preferred model
with a reduced sample including both other information and our estimate of core
earnings. The estimated coefficients on the five models are 1.840 (p < 0.001), 0.575
(insignificant), 0.924 (p < 0.001), 0.342 (insignificant) and 0.267 (insignificant). The
coefficient on the capital expenditure variable is significant and positive whenever the
full sample is used and positive but insignificant when it is not. In our preferred model
the coefficient on capital expenditure is only 15% of the estimate from the base model.
This is consistent with our contention that the valuation model should be used with
caution when evaluating the value relevance of accounting choices, firm characteristics
or management decisions.
C© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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(iii) Testing the Role of Dividends as a Surrogate for Core Earnings and Other
Information
We suggest that previous models of value have tended to overstate the value relevance
of dividends due to a strong relationship between dividends and core net income as
was suggested in Rees (1997), Fama and French (1998) and Giner and Rees (1999).
In a model where core income is important to value, yet is inadequately captured in
the explanatory variables, the coefficient on dividends will tend to become inflated if
it is correlated with the omitted core income variable. The same rationale applies to
other information. Where other information is associated with value, is correlated with
dividends and is omitted from the model, the coefficient on dividends will again be
inflated. In Table 5 we report the results of our models of core income (models 1 to 4)
and other information (models 5 to 8) including all remaining explanatory variables
from our valuation models. In models 1, 3, 5 and 7 we use the full sample and in 2, 4,
6 and 8 we restrict the model to profitable dividend-payers.
As can be seen from Table 5, dividends are strongly positively associated with core
net income and with other information. In all eight models, the slope coefficient on
dividends is statistically significant but, in models where the sample is restricted to
profitable dividend payers, the coefficient declines considerably yet remains positive
and statistically significant. Where other information is added to the model of core net
income, and where core net income is added to the model of other information, the
coefficient on dividends declines marginally but remains strongly significant. The net
impact of dividends in the explanatory models requires an adjustment for the impact
of dividends on the book value of equity, but in all instances the coefficient on book
value is minor and the net impact and gross impact of dividends on either core net
income or other information remains statistically significant.
The other capital changes coefficients are also typically negative and significant
except for models 1 and 3 for core net income, and after adjustment for the impact of
the book value of equity they exhibit a significant negative effect in all models except
7 and 8. In all instances the coefficient on dividends and other capital changes are
significantly different.
(iv) Dividends as Predictors of Subsequent Earnings
In Table 6 we report the results of the models predicting net income and expected
net income. The two measures of expected earnings potentially have different
implications. Value is a function of expected earnings but actual earnings includes
unexpected elements that will often be transient whilst expected net income includes
biases introduced by the analysts (Ramnath et al., 2008). Thus, both measures of
expectations are imperfect and we treat it as an empirical question as to which is
the better measure. In Table 6 we report the results of the model of next year’s net
income with model 1 for the full sample, model 2 restricted to profitable dividend
payers repeated as models 3 and 4 but with core net income added. In models 5 to 8
we repeat the analysis but with forecast net income as the dependent variable.
It is clear that whenever the sample includes loss-making firms (models 1, 3, 5 and
7) the coefficients on net income are relatively low and the coefficient on dividends
relatively high. The dividend effect is significantly different from zero in all instances
and the net effect after allowing for the impact on the book value of equity is also
C© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE AND ACCOUNTING MODELS OF VALUE 667
T
ab
le
5
M
od
el
s
of
C
or
e
E
ar
n
in
gs
an
d
O
th
er
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
M
od
el
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
D
ep
.v
ar
.
cn
i t
cn
i t
cn
i t
cn
i t
oi
t
oi
t
oi
t
oi
t
I/
B
/E
/S
I/
B
/E
/S
I/
B
/E
/S
I/
B
/E
/S
Sa
m
pl
e
I/
B
/E
/S
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
I/
B
/E
/S
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
I/
B
/E
/S
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
I/
B
/E
/S
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
1/
bv
t
0.
10
8*
**
−0
.0
42
8*
0.
10
4*
**
−0
.0
12
6
0.
12
9
−1
.2
41
**
*
−0
.0
76
9
−1
.1
13
**
*
(5
.3
4)
(2
.3
2)
(5
.4
0)
(0
.7
1)
(0
.8
2)
(6
.4
4)
(0
.4
8)
(6
.1
3)
bv
t
0.
03
64
**
*
0.
04
62
**
*
0.
04
73
**
*
0.
05
66
**
*
−0
.3
78
**
*
−0
.4
27
**
*
−0
.4
47
**
*
−0
.5
65
**
*
(8
.9
0)
(1
5.
11
)
(1
2.
81
)
(1
7.
12
)
(1
4.
64
)
(1
3.
45
)
(1
6.
60
)
(1
6.
62
)
ni
t
0.
21
9*
**
0.
61
2*
**
0.
17
9*
**
0.
54
4*
**
1.
37
5*
**
2.
80
8*
**
0.
95
7*
**
0.
97
8*
**
(1
5.
00
)
(2
7.
66
)
(1
3.
02
)
(2
4.
06
)
(1
7.
19
)
(1
9.
20
)
(1
0.
31
)
(4
.0
0)
rd
t
−0
.0
34
3
0.
10
7*
**
−0
.0
71
8*
*
0.
09
46
**
*
1.
29
7*
**
0.
49
6
1.
36
2*
**
0.
17
7
(1
.2
8)
(3
.7
9)
(2
.7
0)
(3
.5
5)
(6
.4
5)
(1
.6
9)
(6
.6
0)
(0
.6
5)
d t
0.
58
4*
**
0.
23
9*
**
0.
47
8*
**
0.
18
9*
**
3.
66
6*
**
2.
04
9*
**
2.
55
3*
**
1.
33
4*
**
(1
3.
94
)
(6
.8
5)
(1
2.
33
)
(5
.8
7)
(1
3.
12
)
(6
.6
7)
(7
.5
1)
(4
.3
8)
oc
t
−0
.0
14
4
−0
.0
31
7*
**
0.
00
93
9
−0
.0
19
0*
*
−0
.8
24
**
*
−0
.5
21
**
*
−0
.7
96
**
*
−0
.4
27
**
*
(1
.2
2)
(4
.0
7)
(0
.8
1)
(2
.7
6)
(9
.6
3)
(5
.7
2)
(8
.3
3)
(5
.0
6)
oi
t
0.
02
89
**
*
0.
02
44
**
*
(1
0.
00
)
(1
1.
94
)
cn
i t
1.
90
6*
**
2.
98
9*
**
(8
.4
3)
(9
.2
2)
N
13
,2
62
10
,0
05
13
,2
62
10
,0
05
13
,2
62
10
,0
05
13
,2
62
10
,0
05
ad
j.
R
2
0.
38
6
0.
70
3
0.
42
0
0.
72
4
0.
27
3
0.
33
4
0.
31
3
0.
38
3
F-
st
at
s:
β
4
−β
1
=
0
15
1.
33
**
*
29
.8
9*
**
11
1.
09
**
*
16
.5
4*
**
20
9.
47
**
*
67
.2
2*
**
82
.0
3*
**
41
.7
6*
**
β
5
−β
1
=
0
24
.1
6*
**
83
.8
6*
**
13
.3
7*
**
97
.4
7*
**
29
.8
0*
**
1.
35
13
.7
8*
**
2.
99
β
4
=
β
5
15
2.
23
**
*
45
.7
0*
**
10
9.
50
**
*
30
.9
6*
**
27
0.
56
**
*
76
.3
8*
**
83
.9
1*
**
33
.4
6*
**
N
ot
es
:
T
h
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
de
fi
n
ed
as
fo
llo
w
s:
m
v t
is
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
co
m
m
on
sh
ar
es
ta
ke
n
si
x
m
on
th
s
af
te
r
th
e
ac
co
un
ti
n
g
ye
ar
en
d,
1/
bv
t
is
th
e
de
fl
at
ed
in
te
rc
ep
t
of
on
e
di
vi
de
d
by
th
e
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
,n
i t
is
n
et
in
co
m
e,
rd
t
is
re
se
ar
ch
an
d
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t,
d t
is
or
di
n
ar
y
di
vi
de
n
ds
,o
c t
is
ot
h
er
ca
pi
ta
lc
h
an
ge
s
su
ch
as
is
su
es
or
re
pu
rc
h
as
es
,o
i t
is
ou
r
es
ti
m
at
e
of
ot
h
er
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
an
d
cn
i t
is
ou
r
es
ti
m
at
e
of
co
re
n
et
in
co
m
e.
A
ll
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
de
fl
at
ed
by
cu
rr
en
tb
oo
k
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
at
t.
T
h
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
m
od
el
s
ar
e:
cn
i i
t
=
β
0
+
β
1
bv
it
+
β
2
ni
it
+
β
3
rd
it
+
β
4
d i
t
+
β
5
oc
it
+
β
6
oi
it
+
e i
t,
an
d
oi
it
=
β
0
+
β
1
bv
it
+
β
2
ni
it
+
β
3
rd
it
+
β
4
d i
t
+
β
5
oc
it
+
β
7
cn
i i
t
+
e i
t.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ar
e
po
ol
ed
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
2-
w
ay
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ye
ar
an
d
by
fi
rm
(P
et
er
se
n
,2
00
9)
.A
bs
ol
ut
e
va
lu
es
of
th
e
t-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
.C
oe
ff
ic
ie
n
ts
or
f-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
th
at
ar
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
lly
si
gn
if
ic
an
ta
re
id
en
ti
fi
ed
by
*
=
p
<
0.
05
,*
*
=
p
<
0.
01
,*
**
=
p
<
0.
00
1.
C© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
668 REES AND VALENTINCIC
T
ab
le
6
Te
st
s
of
Pr
ed
ic
ti
ve
A
bi
lit
y
M
od
el
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
D
ep
.v
ar
.
ni
t+
1
ni
t+
1
ni
t+
1
ni
t+
1
fn
i t+
1
fn
i t+
1
fn
i t+
1
fn
i t+
1
I/
B
/E
/S
I/
B
/E
/S
I/
B
/E
/S
I/
B
/E
/S
Sa
m
pl
e
I/
B
/E
/S
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
I/
B
/E
/S
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
I/
B
/E
/S
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
I/
B
/E
/S
ni
t
&
d t
>
0
1/
bv
t
−0
.0
87
5
−0
.0
94
4
−0
.0
59
1
−0
.0
17
4
0.
27
0*
**
0.
14
5*
**
0.
16
6*
**
0.
13
5*
**
(1
.7
2)
(1
.3
2)
(0
.9
2)
(0
.4
0)
(6
.4
8)
(3
.6
7)
(4
.1
5)
(4
.0
8)
bv
t
0.
01
14
−0
.0
07
52
−0
.0
00
82
4
−0
.0
33
2*
**
0.
09
66
**
*
0.
04
41
**
*
0.
06
00
**
*
−0
.0
18
4*
**
(1
.3
2)
(1
.0
9)
(0
.0
9)
(3
.8
1)
(1
4.
60
)
(8
.9
0)
(1
2.
60
)
(4
.3
3)
ni
t
0.
60
8*
**
0.
97
6*
**
0.
55
2*
**
0.
69
7*
**
0.
23
6*
**
0.
77
4*
**
0.
12
5*
**
0.
10
1*
*
(1
6.
46
)
(1
9.
12
)
(1
0.
90
)
(1
2.
09
)
(9
.3
6)
(2
1.
88
)
(6
.5
6)
(2
.9
5)
cn
i t
0.
33
6*
**
0.
48
4*
**
0.
74
4*
**
1.
18
2*
**
(7
.4
8)
(6
.2
8)
(1
9.
70
)
(1
6.
68
)
rd
t
−0
.0
71
6
−0
.0
50
0
−0
.0
46
1
−0
.0
87
9
−0
.1
07
*
0.
15
2*
*
−0
.0
47
8
0.
01
67
(1
.4
8)
(1
.0
4)
(1
.1
1)
(1
.7
0)
(2
.3
0)
(3
.2
9)
(1
.4
4)
(1
.3
4)
d t
0.
63
1*
**
−0
.0
09
59
0.
37
3*
**
−0
.1
25
*
0.
88
8*
**
0.
24
8*
**
0.
45
2*
**
0.
02
50
(7
.5
4)
(0
.1
5)
(5
.8
3)
(2
.0
7)
(1
3.
12
)
(3
.8
6)
(1
1.
11
)
(0
.9
3)
oc
t
0.
05
71
*
−0
.0
17
1
0.
05
33
*
−0
.0
08
21
0.
02
00
−0
.0
36
3*
*
0.
01
71
−0
.0
13
4*
(2
.0
9)
(0
.6
8)
(2
.2
4)
(0
.3
3)
(1
.2
3)
(3
.1
0)
(1
.0
4)
(2
.0
8)
oi
t
0.
00
15
7
0.
01
46
*
−0
.0
00
13
2
0.
00
72
8
0.
04
11
**
*
0.
03
88
**
*
0.
02
10
**
*
0.
00
78
9*
*
(0
.2
5)
(2
.3
0)
(0
.0
2)
(1
.2
1)
(1
1.
24
)
(1
0.
20
)
(6
.3
1)
(3
.2
2)
N
14
,2
54
10
,2
82
12
,2
98
9,
37
8
15
,3
88
10
,9
56
13
,2
62
10
,0
05
ad
j.
R
2
0.
26
8
0.
27
9
0.
26
3
0.
28
5
0.
32
4
0.
63
4
0.
52
7
0.
85
2
F–
st
at
s:
γ
4
−
γ
1
=
0
48
.7
7*
**
0.
28
31
.8
8*
**
2.
17
12
2.
84
**
*
9.
73
**
*
87
.5
5*
**
2.
88
*
γ
5
−
γ
1
=
0
2.
73
*
0.
20
5.
29
*
0.
95
33
.9
7*
**
51
.2
4*
**
9.
30
**
*
0.
36
γ
4
=
γ
5
41
.9
2*
**
0.
52
24
.9
5*
**
4.
73
*
13
5.
54
**
*
15
.9
4*
**
82
.1
8*
**
1.
97
**
*
N
ot
es
:
T
h
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
de
fi
n
ed
as
fo
llo
w
s:
m
v t
is
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
co
m
m
on
sh
ar
es
ta
ke
n
si
x
m
on
th
s
af
te
r
th
e
ac
co
un
ti
n
g
ye
ar
en
d,
1/
bv
t
is
th
e
de
fl
at
ed
in
te
rc
ep
t
of
on
e
di
vi
de
d
by
th
e
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
,n
i t
is
n
et
in
co
m
e,
rd
t
is
re
se
ar
ch
an
d
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t,
d t
is
or
di
n
ar
y
di
vi
de
n
ds
,o
c t
is
ot
h
er
ca
pi
ta
lc
h
an
ge
s
su
ch
as
is
su
es
or
re
pu
rc
h
as
es
,o
i t
is
ou
r
es
ti
m
at
e
of
ot
h
er
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
an
d
cn
i t
is
ou
r
es
ti
m
at
e
of
co
re
n
et
in
co
m
e.
A
ll
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
de
fl
at
ed
by
cu
rr
en
tb
oo
k
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
at
t.
T
h
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
m
od
el
s
ar
e:
ni
it
+1
=
γ
0
+
γ
1
bv
it
+
γ
2
ni
it
+
γ
3
rd
it
+
γ
4
d i
t
+
γ
5
oc
it
+
γ
6
oi
it
+
γ
7
cn
i i
t
+
e i
t,
an
d
fn
i i
t+
1
=
γ
0
+
γ
1
bv
it
+
γ
2
ni
it
+
γ
3
rd
it
+
γ
4
d i
t
+
γ
5
oc
it
+
γ
6
oi
it
+
γ
7
cn
i i
t
+
e i
t.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ar
e
po
ol
ed
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
2-
w
ay
cl
us
te
re
d
by
ye
ar
an
d
by
fi
rm
(P
et
er
se
n
,2
00
9)
.A
bs
ol
ut
e
va
lu
es
of
th
e
t-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
.C
oe
ff
ic
ie
n
ts
or
F-
st
at
is
ti
cs
th
at
ar
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
lly
si
gn
if
ic
an
ta
re
id
en
ti
fi
ed
by
*
=
p
<
0.
05
,*
*
=
p
<
0.
01
,*
**
=
p
<
0.
00
1.
C© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE AND ACCOUNTING MODELS OF VALUE 669
significant. When the sample is restricted to profitable dividend-payers dividends no
longer have any predictive value for subsequent net income but they continue to
have a positive and statistically significant incremental predictive value for forecast
net income. When core net income is introduced to the model it attracts a statistically
significant positive coefficient and the coefficient on dividends declines. However, the
main insight from these results is that, once loss-makers are removed from the sample,
dividends do not predict future net income but do predict forecast net income.
Clubb (2013) provides a model where dividends incrementally predict future residual
income and hence have a positive association with value. In that model dividends may,
after adjustment for their impact on value through the coefficient on the book value
of equity, still exhibit dividend displacement.
5. CONCLUSION
Using a large and recent sample of publicly quoted UK firms spanning 22 years, we
replicate previous results which show that dividends have a strongly significant and
positive coefficient in a conventional model of firm value. However, if we improve
the competing information set by restricting the sample to profitable dividend-paying
firms, or by including proxies for either core income or other information, the
coefficient on dividends becomes much lower. When the sample is restricted and both
other information and core earnings are included we are unable to reject dividend
displacement, other capital displacement or equality between the coefficients on
dividends and other capital changes. Our examination of the relationship between
dividends and a) core earnings, b) other information, and c) expected earnings
demonstrates that the main driver of our results is the relationship between dividends
and expected earnings. Where the model specification is effective in including
indicators of expected earnings, dividends have an impact on value that is broadly
consistent with dividend displacement. Where the independent variables in the model
other than dividends are ineffective in modelling expectations, dividends have a strong
positive relationship with value.
Our conclusion that dividend displacement cannot be rejected requires that we
restrict the analysis to a sub-sample where we are confident in the experimental
setting. This approach differs from many existing market-based accounting research
papers where it is more common to strive for the largest sample possible. This is
understandable, but we seek to investigate an anomalous result and one that we
clearly show is influenced by the model specification and sample composition. In these
circumstances it is important to identify those elements of the sample or characteristics
of the model that lead to apparent positive value relevance for dividends. The
sample we are left with consists of profitable, dividend-paying firms for which analysts’
forecasts are available. These are not unusual firms.
Our results do not demonstrate that dividends are never value relevant. Indeed
recent German evidence derived from a short window event study of dividend surprise
suggests that dividends may convey price relevant information (Andres et al., 2013).
Furthermore both Pope and Wang (2005) and Clubb (2013) suggest that accounting
conservatism may drive a positive coefficient on dividends and taxation, agency and
signalling explanations for dividend value relevance have been often postulated
(Clubb and Walker, 2012). In eight sub-samples we reject dividend displacement three
C© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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times and when we estimate the preferred model for the full sample using a panel-data
approach we again reject dividend displacement. There appears to be the potential
to further investigate the relationship between dividend value relevance and both
accounting conservatism and firm characteristics.
However, our results clearly establish that the driving characteristic of the coeffi-
cient on dividends is the relationship between dividends and expected earnings given
the predictive power of other variables in the model. Excluding loss-making firms
increases the predictive ability of current earnings and including either other infor-
mation or core earnings reduces the information content of dividends. Under these
circumstances any value relevance of dividends arising from accounting conservatism
or firm characteristics is masked by the variation in the predictive ability of dividends.
Our results imply that dividend displacement is a reasonable initial assumption
regarding the relationship between dividends and value for the typical profitable
dividend-paying firms. They also explain why a long list of earlier papers, including
Rees (1997), Fama and French (1998), Giner and Rees (1999), Akbar and Stark
(2003), Hand and Landsman, (2005), Pinkowitz et al. (2006), Dittmar et al. (2007),
Poletti Hughes (2008), Dedman et al. (2009), Gregoriou (2010) and Dedman et al.
(2012) report results where dividends appear to have a strong positive impact on value.
We also show, using capital expenditure as an example, that using an accounting-based
valuation model to assess the value relevance of firm characteristics or accounting
information is potentially unreliable. For a restricted sample where expectations can
be effectively modelled the approach may be appropriate but researchers should take
care when selecting their experimental setting.
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